The final step in the proof of Proposition 1 (p.311) of Mukerji and Tallon (2003) may not hold in general because ε > 0 in the proof cannot be chosen independently of w, z. We point out by a counterexample that the axioms they impose are too weak for Proposition 1. We introduce a modified set of axioms and re-establish the proposition.
Introduction
Say that a decision maker (DM) exhibits portfolio inertia for an asset if she strictly prefers a zero position to taking a short or long position under a non-degenerate price interval. Portfolio inertia has been attributed to ambiguity by several literature, which rely on particular functional forms, for example, maximin expected utilities. In a non-parametric setting, Proposition 1 in Mukerji and Tallon (2003) claims that Ellsberg-type ambiguity averse behavior implies portfolio inertia.
As is known, however, smooth ambiguity preferences can accommodate the Ellsberg Paradox. 1 This smooth model suggests that ambiguity aversion does not necessarily imply portfolio inertia, because portfolio inertia means that preference has a kink at the origin (zero position).
In this note, we provide as a counterexample to Proposition 1 in Mukerji and Tallon (2003) a smooth ambiguity preference satisfying all the assumptions, but exhibiting no portfolio inertia. To reestablish the proposition, we introduce three additional axioms and show that, under those axioms, their original assumptions and axioms are sufficient for subjective portfolio inertia. The additional axioms do not a priori preclude most of smooth, convex, and monotonic preferences. The counterexample turns out to be a knife-edge case. The key axiom introduced to re-establish
A Counterexample
The final step in the proof of Proposition 1 (p.311) of Mukerji and Tallon (2003) may not hold in general because ε > 0 in the proof cannot be chosen independently of w, z. More explicitly, we provide the following counterexample of the proposition: Consider following spreference on F represented with a second-order probability a:
where ϕ(x) = −e −x . Since U is smooth, it does not exhibit portfolio inertia. As shown below, however, U satisfies all the assumptions and axioms of Proposition 1.
• Probabilistic Sophistication on the set of unambiguous acts F ua : we can verify that
is the set of unambiguous events and that is probabilistically sophisticated on F ua with π({s 1 }) = π({s 2 }) = 1/4, π({s 1 , s 2 }) = π({s 3 , s 4 }) = 1/2, and π({s 1 , s 3 , s 4 }) = π({s 2 , s 3 , s 4 }) = 3/4.
In order to verify {s 1 , s 3 } is an ambiguous event, let A = {s 2 }, B = {s 4 }, T c \ (A ∪ B) = ∅, T = {s 1 , s 3 }, x = 100, x * = 0, z = 0, and z = 100 in the definition of unambiguous events. Since ϕ is strictly concave, this combination violates the definition. Similarly, in order to verify {s 3 } is an ambiguous event, let A = {s 2 }, B = {s 4 }, T c \ (A ∪ B) = {s 1 }, T = {s 3 }, h = 100, x = 100, x * = 0, z = 0, and z = 100. The symmetric argument works for the other cases.
• Weak Risk Aversion on F ua : for any f ∈ F ua , let
• Axiom 1 (Local Invariance): since
, for any λ ∈ (0,λ). Hence, the sameλ works.
•
• A2 for X = R:
Modification
In order to reestablish Proposition 1, we introduce additional axioms as follows:
Axiom 2 always holds if the upper contour set of at 0 is convex.
The next axiom roughly says that in a neighborhood at 0 the valuation of s 2 is not identical with one of s 3 .
Axiom 4 (Persistence) There exist w = 0 and ε > 0 such that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1],
Notice that Axiom 4 does not a priori exclude most of smooth preferences. Any utility representation U : F → R which is smooth at 0 satisfies Axiom 4 as long as U 2 (0) does not coincide with U 3 (0), where U i (0) is the partial derivative at 0 with respect to coordinate i. 2 Hence, any SEU decision maker with a smooth utility u and a subjective probability π such that π 2 = π 3 satisfies Persistence. CEU decision makers might or not satisfy the axiom, depending on the capacity. The axiom is discussed at length in the next section.
where o(f λ ) and o(g λ ) are residual functions. As long as U2(0) = U3(0), we can choose w = 0 so as to make the term 2w(U2(0) − U3(0)) positive. Thus, there exist ε > 0 andλ > 0 small enough such that U (f λ ) > U (g λ ) for any λ ∈ (0,λ). Thus, redefining w, ε if necessary, any smooth representation with U2(0) = U3(0) satisfies Local Disagreement.
The function (1) satisfies Local Convexity and Monotonicity, but violates Persistence. Indeed, taking into account U i (0) = ϕ (0)/4 for all i, the same argument in footnote 2 implies, for any w = 0 and ε > 0,
For all λ > 0 small enough, U (f λ ) < U (g λ ), hence U violates Persistence. Under these new axioms, we can reestablish Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 . Consider preference satisfying Local Convexity, Monotonicity, and Persistence. Assume events {s 1 , s 2 } and {s 3 , s 4 } are unambiguous events and that is weakly risk averse on F ua . Suppose satisfies A1 and A2 for X = R. Then, for all w, z with w = z, there exists a subjective portfolio inertia interval Nε (p * ) ≡ (p * −ε, p * +ε) ,ε > 0, such that for all p ∈ Nε(p * ) and all λ > 0,
Two remarks are in order regarding Proposition 1 . First, p * in the subjective portfolio inertia interval Nε(p * ) may not be the mean price p ≡ (w + z)/2 unlike the original proposition.
Second, Proposition 1 implies that most of smooth preferences, that is, representations U with U 2 (0) = U 3 (0), which satisfy Local Convexity, Monotonicity and A2, are inconsistent with the Ellsberg-type behavior A1. The counterexample (1) turns out to be a "knife-edge" case. Indeed, once U is slightly perturbed in terms of the second-order probability, it must violate A1. For example, consider an ε-perturbed representation
where ϕ : R → R is a smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function. Now U ε satisfies Persistence because U 2 (0) = ϕ (0)(1/4 − ε) = ϕ (0)/4 = U 3 (0). It satisfies also Local Convexity, Monotonicity and A2, and hence, from Proposition 1 , violates A1.
More on Axiom 4
In this section we discuss Axiom 4 in more details. In particular, we show how Axiom 4 provides a neat dividing line between two classes of ambiguity sensitive preferences, the smooth ambiguity preferences and MEU/CEU preferences. To interpret the axiom, we consider preferences satisfying A1: hence, SEU decision makers are excluded because they are inconsistent with A1. But, a class of smooth ambiguity preferences (second-order probability model) is still consistent with A1.
Assume that satisfies A1 for X = R.
Axiom 4 (Persistence): There exist w = 0 and ε > 0 such that, for all λ ∈ (0, 1],
To understand the spirit of the axiom (and, indeed, why we call it "persistence") take the negation of Axiom 4.
Axiom 4' (Preference Reversal for Small Payoffs): For all w = 0 and ε > 0, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(2) Take any w = 0. A1 implies
As long as preference satisfies continuity, there exists a small ε > 0 such that
This ranking means that certain payoff ε > 0 is not enough for the DM to undertake the ambiguous act. Axiom 4' requires that, if all payoffs are diminishing proportionally to zero, ranking (3) is always reversed. That is, any small payoff ε is a sufficient compensation for the ambiguous act if all payoffs are close to zero. Presumably, this is because the DM perceives that the numbers of red and black balls in urn II are identical, that is, {s 1 , s 3 } and {s 2 , s 4 } are equally likely events when payoffs are negligible. In this case, the expected payoff of the first act in (2) is λε, while that of the second act is zero. That is why ranking (3) is reversed if λ is sufficiently small.
Notice that A1 and Axiom 4' capture the characteristic of the DM with smoothly ambiguous preferences. She may exhibit ambiguity averse behavior if two acts are sufficiently different, but not when payoffs are arbitrarily close to zero, making the two acts "virtually" the same. In other words, she is "locally" an SEU decision maker, that is, she simply calculates the expected utility with respect to a base prior (mean prior) to evaluate the acts whose consequences are sufficiently close to zero. Now the meaning of Axiom 4 is clear. It requires that there exists w = 0 and ε > 0 such that ranking (3) is not reversed no matter how the payoffs get small. In other words, for some w = 0 and ε > 0, certain payoff λε is not enough for the DM to take the ambiguous act. She persists in exhibiting ambiguity aversion, i.e., a preference for the risky act as compared to the ambiguous act. (A risky (respectively, ambiguous) act is an act measurable with respect to a partition of the state space consisting of unambiguous (ambigous) events.) Hence, while A1 captures ambiguity aversion, together with A1, Axiom 4 captures how strongly the DM exhibits ambiguity aversion. For some w = 0 and a certainty payoff ε > 0, the DM persistently prefers the risky act to the ambiguous act even when all payoffs are negligibly small.
Next we show that there are MEU preferences that satisfy both A1 and Axiom 4. Let ∆ ⊂ R 4 be the 3-dimensional unit simplex. Since there are identical numbers of red and black balls in urn I, we pay attention to MEU representations with sets of priors
Thus {s 1 , s 2 } and {s 3 , s 4 } are equally-likely unambiguous events. Let
If M ⊂ ∆ II I , {s 1 , s 3 } and {s 2 , s 4 } are also unambiguous events for any MEU decision maker with (u, M ). Notice that any π ∈ ∆ II I can be rewritten as (1/4 − δ, 1/4 + δ, 1/4 + δ, 1/4 − δ) for some δ ∈ R. Claim 1. Assume that a payoff function u : R → R is strictly increasing and smooth at zero. An MEU representation (u, M ) with M ⊂ ∆ I satisfies Axiom 4 if and only if M ⊂ ∆ II I . (2003) shows that, Under A1, {s 1 , s 3 } and {s 2 , s 4 } are ambiguous events whenever {s 1 , s 2 } and {s 3 , s 4 } are unambiguous events. Thus, Claim 1 implies that any MEU preferences satisfying A1 and the natural restriction (4) automatically satisfies Axiom 4. In other words, Axiom 4 is innocuous for this class of preferences.
Proposition 3 of Mukerji and Tallon
A CEU decision maker with the capacity
satisfies Axiom 4. To see this, notice that the same preference admits the MEU representation with the set of priors core(ν) ≡ {π ∈ ∆|π(E) ≥ ν(E), for all event E}.
Any π ∈ core(ν) satisfies π 1 + π 2 = π 3 + π 4 = 1/2. Moreover, the belief (π * 1 , π * 2 , π * 3 , π * 4 ) = (3/8, 1/8, 3/8, 1/8) ∈ core(ν) satisfies π * 1 + π * 3 = π * 2 + π * 4 . From Theorem 1, this MEU representation satisfies Axiom 4.
For a smooth preference, the gradient at 0 can be interpreted as the DM's probabilistic belief. Since urn I contains identical numbers of red and black balls, we assume that
Claim 2. Assume that U : R 4 → R is strictly increasing and smooth at zero, and U 1 (0)+U 2 (0) = U 3 (0) + U 4 (0). Then, U satisfies Axiom 4 if and only if
That is, the DM with a smooth preference satisfies Axiom 4 if and only if {s 1 , s 3 } and {s 2 , s 4 } are not equally likely in terms of the belief at 0. Corollary 1. Assume that a payoff function u : R → R is strictly increasing and smooth at zero. An SEU representation (u, π) with π 1 + π 2 = π 3 + π 4 satisfies Axiom 4 if and only if π 1 + π 3 = π 2 + π 4 .
Conclusion
Ambiguity aversion can be explained by several models. Especially, there exist two different models, MEU model and second-order probability model. A question is how those two models are distinguished by observable behavior. 3 In the model of Ellsberg's two-color experiment, the following restrictions seem plausible:
(i) MEU Model: (1) any π ∈ M satisfies π 1 + π 2 = π 3 + π 4 , and (2) there exists π * ∈ M such that π * 1 + π * 3 = π * 2 + π * 4 (because urn II is ambiguous).
(ii) A Smooth Ambiguity Preference Model: the mean priorπ of the second-order probability µ satisfiesπ i = 1/4 for all i (because of the symmetric nature of the model).
Suppose that satisfies A1. This decision maker could be an MEU agent or a second-order probability agent (or something else). From Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we conclude that
That is, to distinguish MEU from smooth ambiguity preference, we can check whether the decision maker exhibits preference reversal for small payoffs. Moreover, together with the modified version of Proposition 1, MEU ⇒ portfolio inertia 2nd-order Prob. ⇒ no portfolio inertia This is a testable implication.     are unambiguous acts. Let π be a probability measure such that is probabilistically sophisticated with π on the set of unambiguous acts. Then A2 implies π ({s 1 , s 2 }) = π ({s 3 , s 4 }) = 1/2, since {s 1 , s 2 } ∪ {s 3 , s 4 } = Ω. Therefore these two acts have zero expected value under the probability π. Hence, by (weak) risk aversion, it is the case that
Thus, taking (6) and (7) together,
Up to here it has simply been the old proof. The following is the reconstructed argument. The reasoning led above is true for all w, z and hence we do know forp = because π 1 + π 2 = π 3 + π 4 = 1/2 for any π ∈ M . On the other hand, by definition, (π *
